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 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
The NPT was negotiated in 1968. It acknowledged the existence of five states that had 
tested nuclear weapons (Britain, America, the Soviet Union, France and China). It called on 
these nuclear weapon states to work towards nuclear disarmament, not help any other 
country acquire nuclear weapons and to assist other countries in developing nuclear 
technologies for civilian purposes, such as nuclear power reactors. In return the non-nuclear 
weapon states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to also work towards nuclear 
disarmament with the nuclear weapon states. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference Britain 
agreed to an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total 
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament”. 
 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
The CTBT was negotiated in 1996. Britain ratified the treaty in 1998. It prohibits any 
explosive nuclear tests but testing nuclear warhead components is still permitted. The 
nuclear weapon states have developed extensive scientific facilities to simulate nuclear 
tests in the absence of physical. testing. 
 
Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ).  
There are five NWFZ covering Africa, Latin 
America, South-East Asia, the South Pacific 
and Central Asia. Mongolia has also formally 
declared itself a NWFZ. Britain has ratified 
protocols to the zones in Africa, Latin 
America and the South Pacific. In doing to 
Britain agrees not to deploy or use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons in these 
geographic areas. Agreement has yet to be 
reached on a protocol to the 1996 treaty 
covering South-East Asia and the 2007 
treaty covering Central Asia. 
 
British nuclear policy is constrained by a number of agreements, rulings 
and treaties. 
Nuclear weapon-free zones  (does not show Central Asian NWFZ) Source: Inter-
national Panel on Fissile Materials website  
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Negative Security Assurances (NSAs).  
In 1978 and again in 1995 Britain and the other nuclear weapon states issued a ‘negative 
security assurance’ to non-nuclear weapon states. This says that Britain “will not use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on 
the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or 
on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a 
non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State”. This 
assurance does not apply to states that are in ‘material breach’ of their own non-
proliferation obligations under the NPT. 
 
1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion.  
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits the use of force for individual or collective 
self-defence. 
 
In 1996 the ICJ issued an Advisory Opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons”. The Court stated that the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict 
are fundamental and constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. 
Customary international law states that use of force must comply with the requirements of 
the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law. The ICJ has confirmed that it is a well-established rule of customary international law 
that a use of force in self-defence must be proportional to the armed attack and necessary 
to respond to it.  
 
The Court concluded that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary 
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles 
and rules of humanitarian law” but it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”.  
 
The British government accepted this Opinion and does not dispute that 
intentional humanitarian law applies to nuclear weapons. The 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocol form the core 
of intentional humanitarian law and have been ratified by the UK. It has 
repeatedly stated that it would only consider use of nuclear weapons in 
“extreme circumstances of self-defence”.  Use of nuclear weapons 
would therefore only be legal if their use constituted a proportionate 
response to aggressive actions, was a necessary response to an attack 
discriminated between combatants and non-combatants and did not 




Geneva Convention poster. 
Source: Library of Congress 
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